The Creation of Department of Homeland Security

Introduction: The Nation Under Siege

The notion that the United States is invincible from a foreign terrorist attack was proven wrong after the tragic events of September 11. The successful terrorist operations carried out in New York and Washington D.C. by members of Al Qaida (AQ) network have revealed to the world that even a powerful country like the United States is not secured from a suicidal terrorist group.

The results of the suicide-attacks against the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon building not only claimed the lives of around 5,350 Americans and foreign expatriates, but they also resulted to the injuries of 6,500 people. These figures do not include the lives of 44 passengers and the flight crew of United Airlines Flight 93 killed when they crashed in the outskirt of Shankville, Pennsylvania while bravely wrestling control of the plane from the terrorists.

The terrorists' operations on September 11 have revealed the softer-sides of the security and intelligence apparatus of the United States government. The much-heralded invincibility of the US Intelligence Community (IC), considered as the best in the world, was later on regarded by the public as an incompetent organization. The IC members' incompetence raised serious concern on the capability to provide the policy-makers with accurate and timely intelligence data on future terrorist operations in the United States.

There are several factors that can be considered why the IC failed to preempt the AQ plot in United States. One of these was the lack of a strategic plan to counter the emerging threats of global terrorism coming from the ranks of the Islamist terrorists after the Cold War. The IC members, particularly the FBI and the CIA, have failed to adjust to the changing geo-political landscape of the world after the downfall of the Berlin wall, which consequently united the two German countries, and the break up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) into independent States.

The political change have shifted the global alliances that even other former Warsaw Pact members (i.e, communist states) became part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - once the nemesis of Warsaw Pact countries. This had left the United States with no traditional military enemies to engage with. The threat to United States' national security via conventional warfare or through missile strikes from the distant European shores has lessened.

The lowering of guards created false security, which apparently affected the collection of intelligence data because of the pressure to disband the CIA in the aftermath of the downfall of communism in Europe. The Democratic Party leaders called for the abolition of the CIA and to transfer its foreign intelligence activities to the US Department of State as well as the CIA’s paramilitary operations to Pentagon.

The demised of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact organization, considered as the “A” list nations in terms of threat to national security before, has caused the United States foreign policy on security to shift to the “B” list nations (e.g., Iraq and North Korea and to the “C” list nations (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti). Accordingly, the immediate attention given to the “B” list nations is to pre-empt them to fill the void left by the “A” list nations and to counter the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction. Security experts claimed that because the focus of the IC resources in the past decade was shifted to the “B” list nations, the IC had never seen the emerging threats coming from the Islamic radical groups, particularly the MAK – the forerunner of AQ network, after the Soviet-Afghan war.

There were estimated 40,000 had core displaced mujahideens who came from various Muslim countries around the world to fight in the so-called holy war in Afghanistan. However, with no more war to win and no more battle to fight, these seasoned fighters went back to their respective countries and some became the leaders of terrorist groups in their localities. As an example, the late Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani who founded the notorious Abu Sayaff Group in the Philippines was a veteran of Soviet-Afghan war. Others had surreptitiously relocated to western countries and secretly formed cell groups in Germany, France and Spain, to name some. These developments were not seen by the IC as a gathering threats to the security of United States until when the September 11 attacks happened.

The IC, prior to September 11, 2001, was comprised of 14 organizations – six coming from the civilian sector and eight from the military sector. Under the Executive Order 12333 (United States Intelligence Activities), the IC is mandated to “collect information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents.”

The IC members are as follows:

Civilian Sector

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. US State Department
4. Treasury Department
5. Energy Department
6. Coast Guard

Military Sector

1. Defense Intelligence Agency
2. National Security Agency
3. National Reconnaissance Office
4. National Imagery and Mapping Agency
5. Army Intelligence
6. Navy Intelligence
7. Air Force Intelligence
8. Marine Intelligence


Agenda Setting: The State-Centric Approach

Prominent leaders in the US Congress have demanded explanations from President George W. Bush why the federal government failed to detect, monitor, and negate the terrorist attacks. The most vocal critic on this issue was New York Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D) when she told the reporters on May 16, 2002 that “the public demands answers immediately . . . and the people of New York deserve those answers more than anyone.”

The Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were not spared from the blame-game either. In the midst of this political turmoil the people demanded accountability. There was a public outcry for the resignations of DCI George Tenet and Director Robert Mueller. The actions and inactions of their organizations were reflective of the way they led and managed the CIA and the FBI prior to September 11 attacks. The public clamor for an explanation on what caused the massive intelligence and security failure has not only reverberated in the streets of America, but also rang in the halls of US Congress.

Rep. Peter Goss (R) , Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, himself a former CIA Intelligence Officer, said that “over the years, success in the FBI meant ‘to go out and apprehend criminals’ prosecute them and ‘get them off the streets’ . . . that approach is still needed but with terrorism there is a new element of integrating overseas intelligence to prevent acts inside the United States.” Likewise, Rep. Jane Harman (D), a ranking member of the intelligence committee, said that “the CIA, which by law operates overseas, and FBI, which operates within the United States, have to rethink their separate roles when it comes to dealing with terrorism. . . I still see a separate law enforcement and intelligence function, but if we stop at the border's edge, we may not be preventing terrorism.”

The political activists and the Democratic Party leaders demanded that the Bush Administration be held accountable for the September 11 tragedies as they happened under his watch. The Republicans countered that the terrorist plan was hatched during the time of the Clinton Administration, which it failed to detect and negate including the terrorists attacks that had happened before then.

On the span of just nine years, from February 26, 1993 in the first bombing of the World Trade Center to its second attack on September 11, 2001, the United States had encountered ten major terrorist hits in the US mainland and on US interests overseas. These attacks have resulted into the total death of 6101 people and injuries to 19,735. The blame game and political mudslinging from both parties have not produced any positive results to address the problems on terrorism. On the other hand, the crisis has spotlighted the years of dysfunctional relationship in the IC, which were then revisited by the members of the US Congress through fact-finding commission.

The US Congress noted the professional jealousies in the IC and this harmful rivalry among the members had hampered the coordination and sharing of information on the terrorists. Reports gathered by the Media, the revelations of FBI whistleblowers, and the results of congressional investigation on the terrorist attacks have concluded that there were operational leads in the hands of the IC members, and had those information been shared with one another, it could have been used to negate the AQ network from carrying the suicide-hijackings.

Moreover, Congressional leaders had also seen the weakness of the FBI to analyze and assess the raw information coming from the field offices. Consider the report of Special Agent Kenneth Williams of Phoenix, Arizona FBI Field Office, who wrote a five-page memorandum on July 10, 2001 about a possible attack inside the United States by the followers of Usama Bin Laden on training in the American flight schools. Why the information did not reach the appropriate officials was very surprising. Senator Richard J. Durbin (D) who attended the closed-door congressional hearing when FBI Special Agent Williams testified before the Judiciary Committee was astonished when he learned that the memorandum did not go up to the chain of command and was “never treated seriously within the F.B.I., never circulated, never analyzed, nor was it referred to the C.I.A."

The responsibility of securing the mainland from terrorist attack is the primary assignment of the FBI; however, the FBI had no strategic plan to address the rising danger posed by Islamist terrorists. The FBI came up with a draft assessment entitled “FBI Report on the Terrorist Threat to United States and a Strategy for Prevention and Response” only in September 2001. The lack of strategic planning on terrorism has clearly reflected on the Bureau’s organizational behavior towards terrorism.

The FBI serves as the federal government’s lead agency in charge to respond, investigate, and prosecute terrorists. However, it will only pursue the terrorists after they have struck, not while they are still in the planning stage. As an example, a request to conduct manhunt on AQ operative Khalid Al-Mihdar in United States was denied by the Bureau heads because the FBI Special Agents are criminal investigators, not intelligence investigators. Al-Mihdar was one of the terrorists that crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon building.

The September 11 tragedies created a groundswell in the US Congress to review the FBI’s role as the lead agency that oversee the efforts in counter-terrorism because their organizational culture and thrusts of operations are not suitable for counter-terrorism. It took the lives of thousands of people for the federal government to finally admit that there is a need to create an organization that will focus mainly on countering the threats of terrorism in US mainland. Thus, after so much discussions and hesitations, the proposal to create a super organization that is distinct from the FBI and CIA has been proposed to the members of the congress by the Bush Administration. The congress, on the other hand, had its own version of domestic agency, which was incorporated later on to the concept of the White House.

Policy Formulation: The Key Government Players

Even before the September 11 tragedies, there was already a call for major changes in governmental structures, infrastructures and processes that relate to protecting the homeland from terrorist threats. During the Clinton Administration, a bipartisan commission known as the US Commission on National Security for the 21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) was created to review, among others, the US national security apparatus. The 14-member Commission were headed by former Senators Gary Hart (D) and Warren Rudman (R). The Commission stated, “The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.”

The Commission recommended the creation of a super organization to be called the National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) that would be in charge of “planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.” The Commission pointed out that was very important to consolidate the various organizations in the federal government like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Coast Guard, Border Patrol and Bureau of Customs to name some. The NHSA, as envisioned, will be created by congress and will be funded by them, too. The Commission submitted its final report to the congress in February 2001.

On April 2001, US Representative William Thornberry (R), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, introduced House Resolution 1158, which called for the creation of NHSA. The resolution did not gain support among his peers. A number of House Resolutions and Senate Bills were later on submitted to the congress purposely to create a domestic security agency.

Days after the terrorist attacks, President Bush, on his address to a joint session of congress in September 20, 2001, announced the creation of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS). The OHS is created under the Presidential Executive Order and function to “coordinate executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.” Bush hand-picked his personal friend Pennsylvania Governor and former Congressman Tom Ridge to direct the OHS.

Many believed the OHS had not met its mission and had not operate freely under its functions because of the way the organization was designed. Senator Joseph Lieberman (D) said: “This is the most important responsibility the federal government will have in the near future, and to give Mr. Ridge less power in this office is just not what the nation needs.”

On September 21, 2001, Senator Bob Graham (D) introduced S. 1449 that will establish the National Office for Combating Terrorism (NOCT). It gained seven co-sponsors in his party, and they were Evan Bayh, Richard Durbin, Barbara Mikulski, Jay Rockefeller, Dianne Feinstein, Bill Nelson and then Susan Collins. The Bill proposed that the NOCT be established under the Executive Office of the President and to be modeled after the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). US Representative Alcee Hastings (D) introduced a counterpart bill in the House of Representatives under H.R. 3078. Senator Graham and Representative Hastings reportedly “promoted the findings of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction under Gilmore Commission.”

Having seen the weakness of the OHS, Senator Lieberman gained a co-sponsor to introduce S.1534 which will establish the Department of National Homeland Security (DNHS). Together with Senator Arlen Specter (R), Senator Lieberman sent the proposed bill to US Senate on October 11, 2001, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs. The Bill 1534, among others, will transfer the authorities, functions, personnel and assets of several agencies in the federal government that deal with security and disaster operations. The Agencies were affected were the FEMA, United States Custom Service, Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), United States Coast Guard, Critical Infrastructure Office and the Institute of Information Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Commerce, and both the National Infrastructure Protection Center and the National Domestic Preparedness Office of the FBI.

A year later, on May 2, 2002, after refining and widening the scope of his original resolution, Representative Thornberry joined with Senator Lieberman to introduce H.R. 4660 and S. 2452 that will establish the Department of National Homeland Security and the National Office for Combating Terrorism. Thornberry got 40 co-sponsors and Lieberman got 5 co-sponsors after two Senate amendments in the proposed bill.

In June 6, 2002, President Bush appeared in the national TV for a televised address from the White House to call for the members of the congress to create a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, which was envisioned to be the central agency that will consolidate the domestic security apparatus against threats of terrorism. Leaders from both parties accepted the announcement in positive manner and promised to work a bipartisan bill to make sure of speedy passage in the US Congress. In response to the President’s request, Representative Richard Armey (R) introduced H.R. 5005 on June 24, 20002 that will establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and for other purposes.

Decision Making: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits

The DHS was established amidst strong challenges and oppositions from union leaders, political activists and civil libertarians and from members of congress themselves. The monetary costs of establishing the DHS became a big issue. Oppositions said that that Bush Administration has created a “big government” that added burden to the tax-paying public for the big expenditures. In addition, the fear that DHS would infringe the civil liberties of the citizens were sounded-off by the civil libertarians. There were trade-offs on the costs and benefits of establishing the DHS, but in the end the benefits in security to the nation had outweighed the cost in monetary obligations.

The Bush Administration’s original plan was to have different personnel systems in the DHS. The plan will allow the Homeland Security Secretary to regulate the pay schedule, performance measures and termination policies. The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGA) opposed this, as the proposal accordingly would diminish the rights of the federal employees to form and join unions.

However, the Senior Executive Association (SEA) supported the President on the ground that “the organizational challenges inherent in creating this new Department and the importance of its mission to all Americans necessitate maintaining current Presidential authority related to national security exclusions from collective bargaining.” Because of the controversy on the civil service issue the legislative proposal has created and the fear that the legislative proposal would be stranded in the Senate, the Republican House leaders Dick Armey and Rep. Rob Portman modified the H.R. 5005 to include the traditional rights of the employees.

The American Civil Liberties Union was very vocal against the establishment of DHS because of the fear that it would operate in secrecy and with no public accountability. On their press release on June 25, 2002 ACLU Legislative Counsel Timothy Edgar said, “If you like the idea of a government agency that is 100 percent secret and 0 percent accountable, you'll love the new Homeland Security Department . . . The Administration's plan exempts the new agency from a host of laws designed to keep government open and accountable and to protect whistleblowers."

One of the opposition to H.R. 5005 is Congressman Ron Paul who said, “Congress was led to believe that the legislation would be a simple reorganization aimed at increasing efficiency, not an attempt to expand federal power. Fiscally conservative members of Congress were even told that the bill would be budget neutral! Yet, when the House of Representatives initially considered creating a Department of Homeland Security, the legislative vehicle almost overnight grew from 32 pages to 282 pages- and the cost had ballooned to at least $3 billion.”

Moreover, some Democratic Party leaders like Senator Tom Daschle opposed certain provisions in the bill like giving pharmaceutical companies who make vaccines a protection from liability, the creation of a research center in the Texas A&M University for Homeland Security programs, the holding of secret meetings by the advisory committee that will favor the corporate lobbyists and the protection from liability of the companies who make anti-terror technologies or products. The Democrats found a supporter in Senator John McCain (R). The opponents to the provisions contend that the Bush administration had politicized the establishment of the DHS by catering to the interests of the special groups.

The consolidation of old offices from other departments into the Homeland Security also was not met favorably by some congressmen seating in the committees of the old offices. The transfer would mean losing oversight over their jurisdiction, much more influence and budgetary control in the committee they are on. Because the congress has the control on the budget of DHS, it was not surprising that the establishment of the Department was under the whims and caprices of congressmen who worried more on losing their clouts over their committees than the threats the terrorists posed to the nation.

The process of identifying the costs of establishing the DHS and the benefits coming from its existence were debated passionately throughout the deliberations in congress and in the public hearings set by the committee. The positive as well as the negative sides of establishing a central domestic anti-terror agency outside the FBI was seriously studied. At the end, the benefits DHS will provide to the nation outweighed the monetary costs and complexities of consolidating other federal agencies into one organization.

H.R. 5005, which had 118 co-sponsors, was passed in the House of Representatives by a YES vote of 295 and a NO vote of 132. H.R. 5005 was received in the Senate on July 30, 2002 and was passed with amendment by a YES vote of 90 to a No vote of 9 on November 19, 2002. The H.R. 5005 was subjected to 409 amendments in the House and the Senate floors, and finally on November 25, 2002, H.R. 5005 was signed by President Bush. H.R. 5005, otherwise known as the Homeland Security Act of 2002, had paved way for the largest reorganization of the federal government since the passage of the 1947 National Security Act that created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Implementation Stage: Integration of Government Agencies


After the President had signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the H.R. 5005 became Public Law no. 107-296. After the policy formulation has transpired, the policy implementation came next. Peters said, “ Once a piece of legislation or a regulation has been accepted as a legitimate public law, in some ways the easiest portion of the policymaking process has already transpired, for government must then put the legislation into effect.” The effect of the legislation established the DHS, which created the newest and second largest executive department second to the size of Department of Defense. The policy of the government on anti-terrorism has now been implemented through the DHS.

The DHS is consists of four line directorates, which are the Border and Transportation Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), Science and Technology (ST), and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP). The US Secret Service and the US Coast Guard remainrd intact and report directly to the DHS while the INS Adjudications and Benefits Program reports directly to Deputy Secretary.

The BTS is composed of the U.S. Customs Service (Treasury), The Immigration and Naturalization Service (part) (Justice), The Federal Protective Service, Transportation Security Administration (Transportation), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Treasury), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (part)Agriculture), and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (Justice).

The EPR is comprised of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System (HHS), Nuclear Incident Response Team (Energy), Domestic Emergency Support Teams (Justice) and the National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI).

The ST directorate includes the CBRN Countermeasures Programs (Energy), Environmental Measurements Laboratory (Energy), National BW Defense Analysis Center Defense), and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (Agriculture).

Lastly, the IAIP was formed from Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (Commerce), Federal Computer Incident Response Center (GSA), National Communications System (Defense), National Infrastructure Protection Center FBI) and the Energy Security and Assurance Program (Energy).

Evaluation Process: Performance Measures and Goals

Peters said, “The first step in evaluation is to identify the goals of the program, but even this seemingly simple task maybe difficult, if not impossible.” The DHS has set of strategic goals that are defined by the words: Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response, Recovery, Service, and Organizational Excellence. The goals are clearly stated publicly and the next step was laying out performance measure to evaluate the goals. Federal agencies are mandated by law under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to set goals, measure performance, and report their accomplishments.

On a report to President Bush and the Congress, the Gilmore Commission said, “the United States needs an improved homeland security strategy to strengthen security communities facing the greatest risk, improve the use of intelligence, increase the role of the state and local officials, and sharpen disaster response apabilities.” The Clinton and Bush Administrations had enacted 87 percent of the recommendations of the Gilmore Commision on security related matters. The Gilmore Commission was headed by former Virginia Gov. James S. Gilmore III.

The important recommendations of the Commission are as follows, “Combine all departmental grant making programs into a single entity in DHS; establish an interagency mechanism for homeland security grants, revise the homeland advisory system to include a regional alert system, training to emergency responders about preventive actions, and specific guidance to potentially affected regions; establish sustained funding to enhance EMS response capacity for acts of terrorism; and establish comprehensive procedures for sharing information with relevant state and local officials”

Conclusion: The Policy Choice, Output and Effect

The establishment of DHS was an avowed public policy statement of the federal government on anti-terrorism. It was the pro-active approach of the Bush Administration on its domestic policy on terrorism. DHS carries all of government’s terrorism activities and programs. The establishment of DHS was a result of the policy choice of the elected officials and their policy output had resulted to the creation of the department. On the other hand, the policy impact was the effect of both the policy choice and policy output of the elected officials, which is to protect the homeland from the terrorist attacks. The process of establishing the DHS went through six stages in public policy process, and these are agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation and evaluation.

In order to legitimize the policy choice of the Bush Administration, the legislative proposal H.R. 5005 was submitted to the congress for enactment into law. The choice to confront the terrorists through a new government agency was not a result of outburst of emotion over the tragic incidents of September 11, rather, the choice to establish the DHS was the result of careful studies and recommendations made by congressional leaders, commissions, political think-tanks and by the Bush Administration. There were also insights and suggestions from the civil libertarians, union organizations and even from officials of the affected government offices. All were taken and reviewed for considerations during public hearing.

The policy output was the result of the policy choice made by the government. Quoting Peters again he said, “Policy outputs are policy choices being put into action.” The choice to confront head-on the threats of terrorism has resulted to the formulation of counter-terrorism programs that will prepare for, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. This policy output had resulted to the consolidation of 180,000 federal employees from around 50 agencies who are involved in Homeland Security effort. Policy output also means policy action of the government on anti-terrorism such as the development and training of the Homeland personnel on techniques in covert operations, improvement of the technological equipments in the field to monitor the activities of target personalities, and to maintain active coordination with the IC members.

The policy effects, the intended results of policy choice and policy output, have on the nation has been the protection of the people from terrorist attacks and the apprehension of the terrorists operating inside United States. Moreover, according to Peters “the policy effects may be influenced by the success and failures of the policy choice and policy output.” The DHS cannot win the fight in counter-terrorism alone. The support and guidance of the originators of the policy (i.e., Bush Administration and the US Congress), were important ingredients in the success of the anti-terrorism programs. The Homeland Security managers are given the important tasks of running the second biggest Department in the government and the expectation for them to successfully lead the agency in combating the terrorists has never been so great.

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Peters, p.5